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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has indisputably been a national emergency
for the United States. But it is certainly not the only emergency that has
consumed this nation’s attention. Before the pandemic, there were 9/11 and
the ensuing War on Terror;1 Hurricanes Katrina, Maria, and Harvey;2 and the
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic,3 to name a few. Before that, there were the
Civil War, two World Wars, and a massive economic depression. Looking
ahead, climate change will certainly entail continual, widespread
emergencies in the United States akin to the drought and wildfires that
brought much of the Australian economy and daily life to a close from 2019
to 2020.4
These national emergencies have all prompted wide-ranging
presidential action. Such presidential action has frequently led courts and
commentators to consider the limits of presidential power, particularly in

1
For 9/11 and the War on Terror, see Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to
Certain Terrorist Attacks, 85 Fed. Reg. 56,467 (Sept. 10, 2020).
2
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL
UNPREPARED, S. REP. NO. 109-322, at 69–70, 73 (2006) (declaring Hurricane Katrina an “incident of
national significance” and a “public-health emergency”); Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related
Determinations, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,874, 45,875 (Sept. 18, 2017) (declaring an emergency for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico due to Hurricane Maria); Disaster Declared in Texas Following
Hurricane Harvey, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NEWS (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/
Article/Article/1292599/disaster-declared-in-texas-following-hurricane-harvey [https://perma.cc/C5CRPG3F] (declaring Hurricane Harvey “a major disaster”).
3
Declaration of a National Emergency with Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic,
Proclamation No. 8443, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,439, 55,439 (Oct. 23, 2009).
4
See, e.g., Graham Readfearn, Inside Australia’s Climate Emergency: The New Fire Zone,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2020/feb/12/
living-in-the-climate-emergency-australias-new-fire-zone [https://perma.cc/5UD7-F8WB] (depicting
how fire has encompassed previously non-arid regions).
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times of emergency.5 For the purposes of this Essay, we will not attempt to
revisit this debate. Rather than focusing on these questions of presidential
rulemaking power, we examine the relatively overlooked but crucial
question of the risk that national emergencies pose to the integrity of the
rulemaking process and the role of the Supreme Court and Congress to
protect the integrity of that process.
Stated bluntly, most Presidents use emergencies to try to push through
controversial rules whether related to the relevant emergency or not.
Emergencies provide an opportunity to achieve what otherwise could not be
achieved. While serving as President Obama’s Chief of Staff, Rahm
Emanuel famously remarked that no crisis should be allowed to go to waste.6
That posture may make sense for a sitting President; but as a matter of good
democratic governance, the procedural protections for the integrity of the
rulemaking process should not be weakened for rules unrelated to any
purported emergency. 7 Nor, for that matter, should such procedural
protections be weakened for rules that are emergency-related but reach far
beyond the relevant emergency in effect, either substantively or temporally.
Section I.A of this Essay begins by examining the rulemaking process
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its notice-and-comment
requirements.8 These requirements provide that all proposed rules should be
published, that anyone can evaluate them and submit comments, and that the
agency must consider and explicitly respond to the comments.9 We describe
how the notice-and-comment process can be understood as serving two (not
inconsistent) goals—a technocratic goal and a deliberative democratic goal.
Section I.B of this Essay then addresses the notice-and-comment process
during emergencies and how a state of emergency can undermine both of
5
For an extensive discussion of how the courts have grappled with presidential claims of emergency
power over time, see generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946–47 (2008) (examining how the
different branches of government have considered and treated presidential power).
6
See Jerry Bellune, Never Let a Crisis Go to Waste, LEXINGTON CNTY. CHRON. & DISPATCH-NEWS
(Mar. 26, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.lexingtonchronicle.com/business/never-let-crisis-go-waste
[https://perma.cc/3R28-M4WP] (“President Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel famously said in
2008, ‘You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. I mean, it’s an opportunity to do things that you
think you could not do before.’”).
7
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1793–94 (2010) (discussing the democratic risks posed by presidential
abuses during emergencies); Brandon J. Johnson, Executives in Crisis: An Examination of Formal and
Informal Emergency Powers, 42 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 341, 347–48 (2020) (same); see also Bruce Ackerman,
The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030 (2004); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1370 (2013).
8
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559).
9
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).
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these goals. In particular, we focus on how emergency conditions impact the
capacity of the public to provide meaningful comments, especially to rules
having nothing to do with the emergency at hand, and how administrations
may—and often do—take advantage of emergency conditions to push such
unrelated rules at precisely the moment when the public is too distracted to
pay much attention. As a case study of this phenomenon, we use the Trump
Administration’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) scientific
evidence rule. This rule attempted to limit the public health evidence that
regulators could use to fashion and justify rules. This rule was dramatically
expanded at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic when the public was
understandably preoccupied. Finally, Part II of this Essay proposes two
solutions—one statutory and one judicial—that would mitigate the harms of
such rulemaking and help ensure that emergency conditions are not abused
by administrations seeking to take advantage of public distraction.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE NOTICE AND COMMENT IN
RULEMAKINGS DURING “EMERGENCIES”
A. Why Notice and Comment Matters in Our Democracy

Before delving into how notice and comment differs during
emergencies, we begin this Section by reviewing the traditional notice-andcomment process under the APA and suggesting that notice and comment
contributes to the well-functioning of a democracy. Under the APA,
proposed legislative rules—understood as rules that will bind future agency
action—generally must be subject to public notice and comment before the
agency can promulgate them as final rules.10 The requirement for the noticeand-comment procedure sets legislative rules in contrast with other sorts of
agency actions, such as policy declarations or purely interpretative rules:
Legislative rules are less easily reversed than nonlegislative rules precisely
because of the notice-and-comment procedure and are thus legally binding.11
For example, a new presidential administration can withdraw agency
guidance documents or position papers or alter the agency’s stated posture
in ongoing adjudications on the first day of a presidency without legal
constraints.12 By contrast, an agency can only withdraw a legislative rule by
10
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96–97 (2015) (holding that legislative rules, in
contrast to interpretive rules, are subject to notice-and-comment constraints and have the “force and effect
of law”) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03 (1979)).
11
See id.
12
See, e.g., Susan Milligan, Two Steps Back, One Step Forward, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan.
29,
2021)
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2021-01-29/biden-spends-first-weekissuing-orders-reversing-trumps-orders [https://perma.cc/5WAD-B9M7] (discussing a rapid flurry of
Biden reversals of Trump Executive Orders).
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proposing a new rule withdrawing the previous legislative rule.13 Such a new
proposed rule also must (typically) satisfy notice-and-comment requirements
and is subject to being challenged in court under the APA as “arbitrary and
capricious.”14 Indeed, courts have suggested that in order for an agency to
justify why it is switching policies with a new rule, it must provide a reasoned
explanation as to why the stated grounds for the previous rule should no
longer be accorded decisive weight. 15 Legislative rules are predicated on
factual mistakes, reflect values outside our political tradition, and/or run
counter to the considered opinion of the polity. Consequently, while all sorts
of agency actions matter and deserve attention, legislative rules are
particularly important as they are the most durable and, thus, the most
difficult to correct.
Notice-and-comment requirements have been criticized as slowing
agency responses to circumstances in the real world to the point that the
requirements can contribute to the ossification of agency actions.16 But these
requirements are important to a well-functioning democracy, serving to
ensure that rules are based on technically sound analysis and that they are at
least somewhat responsive to the values of the polity. To take the technical
soundness point first, the primary rationale for judicial deference to agencies
regarding the substance of their rules is that agencies, unlike courts, have the
specialized technical expertise in the relevant subject matter. 17 But what
assurance is there that the agencies are actually deploying that technical
expertise and reflecting it in their rules? That cannot simply be assumed.
When rules are proposed with adequate notice, groups and individuals within
the public can review the agency’s stated technical justifications and point
to gaps or errors in data or analysis. Take, for instance, the Trump
Administration’s proposed fuel economy rule which sought to undo the fuel
economy requirements promulgated under the Obama Administration after
13
See Perez, 575 U.S. at 101 (holding that the APA “mandate[s] that agencies use the same
procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first instance”); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (holding
that “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the
change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance”).
14
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 42; TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 15 (2017) (“[A]n agency rule that implements a
policy change by amending or repealing an existing rule is also subject to arbitrary and capricious
review.”).
15
See David A. Dana & Michael Barsa, Judicial Review in an Age of Hyper-Polarization and
Alternative Facts, 9 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 231, 234–39 (2018) (reviewing the relevant
case law on policy shifts by agencies).
16
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992).
17
See Dana & Barsa, supra note 15, at 233.

227

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

a 2018 review by the EPA.18 Sometimes, as with the Trump Administration’s
proposed fuel economy rule, public comments will be so forceful that the
agency may feel compelled to redo its technical analysis, at least in part.19
Moreover, technical criticisms from the public in the administrative record—
as well as the agency’s lack of persuasive response to them—allows courts
to reject an agency’s inadequate proffered justification for a rule and vacate
or remand the rule. The result is that the agency can exercise the technical
expertise that the public rightly demands it exercise in good faith.20
Technical expertise aside, the notice-and-comment process also helps
to ensure that rulemakings reflect public deliberation over the nation’s
values, at least to a degree. Notice and comment makes rulemaking more
democratic—more public-inclusive—than would otherwise be the case.
Agencies often fashion rules based on broad delegations of authority from
Congress. Absent specific instructions from Congress, and without a noticeand-comment process, the public—including state and local governments,
NGOs, and business groups, to name a few—might have no real sense of
what an agency is planning to do until it is done in the form of a binding rule
which can harm its interests. Notice-and-comment periods afford the public
an opportunity to argue that the proposed rule embodies unsound, or even
immoral, policy and is inconsistent with a reasonable understanding of the
agency’s legislative mandate.21 In many cases, as critical comments pour in,
the press will feature stories about controversial proposed rules, which in
turn may engender more public debate. And even if the agency does not
modify the proposed rule in response to the public comments, judges, in
reviewing the rule in an APA challenge, may access those comments and the
18
U.S. EPA and DOT Propose Fuel Economy Standards for MY 2021-2026 Vehicles, EPA (Aug. 2,
2018), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/us-epa-and-dot-propose-fuel-economy-standards-my2021-2026-vehicles.html [https://perma.cc/SC5S-PUZP]; Coral Davenport, U.S. to Announce Rollback
of Auto Pollution Rules, a Key Effort to Fight Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/climate/trump-fuel-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/PTN4HLX4].
19
See Robinson Meyer, The Trump Administration Flunked Its Math Homework, ATLANTIC (Oct.
31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/10/trumps-clean-car-rollback-is-riddledwith-math-errors-clouding-its-legal-future/574249 [https://perma.cc/V2LT-L46W].
20
See, e.g., Carlson v. Postal Regul. Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 340, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (vacating a
postal service rule on the grounds that the agency had failed to engage in reasoned explanation for its
proposal as illustrated by its failure to address objections raised by commentators).
21
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 496 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228 (D.D.C. 2020)
(stating that “a purpose of notice-and-comment provisions under the APA . . . is ‘to ensure that affected
parties have an opportunity to participate in and influence agency decision making at an early stage, when
the agency is likely to give real consideration to alternative ideas’” and “to give affected parties an
opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance
the quality of judicial review”) (alteration in original) (first quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies
v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2013); then quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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agency’s responses and may be influenced by the extent the agency took
account of public concerns. 22 Overall, notice-and-comment rulemaking
allows for a degree of public inclusion and debate and, hence, democratic
legitimacy that otherwise would be lacking in the administrative process.23
B. Emergencies and Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
1. Defining Emergencies
Before addressing notice-and-comment rulemaking during
“emergencies,” we must define emergency, which itself is no simple task.
The Supreme Court has seemed to acknowledge that the President has an
inherent power to declare and act upon an emergency, particularly but not
exclusively, in the President’s role as commander-in-chief. Government
must go on even during emergency periods like wars and pandemics. But
there has long been a concern that the President will abuse this inherent
power (however defined) and exceed its constitutional limits. In the most
famous Supreme Court case on this issue, the Youngstown steel seizure case,
the Court held that the President lacked constitutional authority to order steel
mills to reopen during the Korean War. 24 However, commenters have
struggled to define the standard set by Youngstown and determine when a
President may do what she otherwise constitutionally could not do in the
name of meeting the immediate demands of an emergency.25
This much is clear: Under current law, while the President has some
constitutionally given emergency powers, 26 especially in her role as
commander-in-chief, Congress also has some constitutional authority to
constrain the exercise of those powers. Through statutes, Congress can
22
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Mark Thomson, Open Minds and Harmless Errors: Judicial
Review of Postpromulgation Notice and Comment, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 307–08 (2016) (explaining
that “requiring an agency to consider a broad range of viewpoints before adopting a rule makes it more
likely the agency will come up with the ‘best’ possible rule” as the agency “benefits from the experience
and input of comments by the public,” and also explaining that “[p]roviding for direct, meaningful public
involvement through prepromulgation notice and comment procedures inserts an element of democracy
into the rulemaking process and thereby legitimates resulting rules”).
23
For an account of the administrative rulemaking process as aimed at facilitating democratic
deliberation on the part of agencies, see Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy,
and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 857 (2012) (explaining that “a ‘deliberative model’ of
administrative legitimacy focuses on the obligation of public officials to engage in reasoned deliberation
on which courses of action will promote the public good” and requires that agency officials “engage in a
decision-making process that considers all of the relevant interests and perspectives, and they must
provide reasoned explanations for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal
citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives”) (footnote omitted).
24
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 587 (1952).
25
See generally Barron & Lederman, supra note at 5 (arguing that the President may constitutionally
exercise her war powers against congressional limitations).
26
See id. at 695 (addressing the ambiguity in the Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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define what constitutes an emergency, what special powers the President
may lawfully exercise in such an emergency, and for what purposes the
President may lawfully exercise those powers. Relevant statutes that
represent Congress’s efforts to legislatively define and constrain the
President’s emergency powers include the Stafford Act,27 the public health
emergencies provision of the Public Health Services Act,28 and the National
Emergencies Act (NEA).29
For their parts, the Stafford Act and the Public Health Services Act
provide some meaningful, reasonably specific limits on when and under
what circumstances the President may declare an emergency. These Acts
also provide states and localities funding through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and other sources. In some cases, they waive
legal requirements and intervene in the marketplace to address the
emergency.30
The NEA does little in practice to constrain the President in acting
under the rubric of emergency. For example, at least for declarations of major
disasters under the Stafford Act, the President must await requests by
governors before acting. 31 By contrast, the NEA gives the President
extremely broad power to declare an emergency solely on the President’s
own initiative. 32 Moreover, the principal constraint in the NEA—the
requirement that the President renew emergencies periodically,33 subject to
Congressional override—has proven illusory: Dozens of emergencies
remain in effect today—several times more than when the Act was passed—
and “[m]ost have been renewed for years on end.” 34 Congress has never
successfully voted to end an NEA emergency.35

27
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat.
4689 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5202).
28
42 U.S.C. § 247d.
29
National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651).
30
See Overview of Stafford Act Support to States, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-stafford.pdf [https://perma.cc/W92G-QF5A].
31
42 U.S.C. § 5170(a); see also How a Disaster Gets Declared, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
(Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.fema.gov/disaster/how-declared [https://perma.cc/CW32-EZZD]
(explaining that “[a]ll requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists shall be made
by the Governor of the affected State” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)).
32
50 U.S.C. § 1621.
33
50 U.S.C. § 1601.
34
See Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers, ATLANTIC (Feb.
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418
[https://perma.cc/95XZ-PZEG].
35
Id.
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Thus, there are at least three relevant and justified ways to understand
“emergency”: (1) as a common-sense concept, as in the case of the COVID19 pandemic, which cannot be understood as anything but a national
emergency regardless of constitutional or statutory definitions; (2) as a
constitutional concept, as in the President’s constitutional authority to
declare a circumstance an emergency and take corresponding actions; and
(3) as a statutory concept, as in the statutory requirements for a declaration
of emergency set out in the Stafford Act or NEA.36
2. Notice and Comment During Emergencies
Regardless of how one understands “emergency,” no President has
argued that emergency conditions justify disregarding notice-and-comment
requirements altogether. Yet statutorily, while the Stafford Act and the NEA
do not address the issue of notice-and-comment requirements, the APA
contains a “good cause” exception to notice-and-comment requirements that
would seemingly allow a President to eschew notice and comment if an
emergency—whether declared under a statute or not—so justified.
Specifically, the APA provides that notice and comment is not required
“when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a
brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.”37 Regardless of this wording, agencies often invoke good cause
without providing much or any explanation as to why forgoing notice and
comment is necessary, and they often do so outside of, and unrelated to,
anything that could be defined as an emergency, whatever definition of
emergency one is employing.38 The courts, postpromulgation, at times have
held that agencies failed to support their assertion of good cause when they

36
See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act Fact Sheet, ASS’N OF STATE
& TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS. (May 2013), https://www.astho.org/programs/preparedness/publichealth-emergency-law/emergency-authority-and-immunity-toolkit/robert-t--stafford-disaster-relief-andemergency-assistance-act-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/JA4B-3Z86] (explaining that the Stafford Act
defines emergencies as “any event for which federal assistance is needed to supplement state/local efforts
to save lives, protect public health and safety, protect property, or avert the threat of a catastrophe”); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (providing the same definition of emergency). See generally JENNIFER K.
ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10267, DEFINITION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY UNDER THE NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES ACT (2019) (surveying the various definitions of national emergencies under the National
Emergencies Act and how courts have defined emergencies because “[t]he National Emergencies Act . . .
does not define what may constitute a national emergency”).
37
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
38
See Kyle Schneider, Note, Judicial Review of Good Cause Determinations Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 73 STAN. L. REV. 237, 239–40, 248–57 (2021) (noting that “many
agencies invoke the exception for a wide range of agency actions” and that “[c]ourts inconsistently
interpret both what constitutes good cause and what deference to give agency assertions of good cause”
and describing cases) (footnote omitted).
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adopted a rule without notice and comment.39 But they have generally not
vacated the rules on the grounds that the agency later sought out comments
even if the agency declined to modify the rule in any substantive way in
response to the comments. 40 Thus, current judicial practice incentivizes
agencies to invoke the good-cause exception and thereby avoid notice and
comment. It is a testament to the general norm in favor of notice and
comment that they do not invoke the exception more than they do.
In our view, the fix for abuse of the good-cause exception needs to be
statutory as the text of the current exception provides no limiting mechanism.
Because of the lack of statutory limits, the courts are also powerless in
limiting agency power in this regard. But the statutory fix can be very simple:
an amendment to the APA providing that any rule adopted under the goodcause exception expires in, for example, six months or a year. An automatic
expiration on a rule makes the rule much less useful to an agency, thereby
removing the incentive to avoid notice-and-comment requirements except
when they truly seem impracticable under the circumstances.
A more difficult issue—and one academic commentators have not
previously addressed—is whether notice-and-comment procedures need to
be adapted during emergencies. For example, should agencies take account
of how emergency conditions impact the capacity of the public to provide
meaningful comments and raise concerns about the rule in the polity and
society as a whole within the standard comment period provided for by the
agency? The notice-and-comment process can only serve its purposes if the
constituent groups in the public—be they NGOs, local governments, or
academic experts—realistically can absorb and respond to the proposed rule
in the time provided. But during an intense national emergency like the
COVID-19 pandemic, the capacity of these constituent groups to attend to
proposed rules—especially ones having nothing to do with the ongoing
emergency, which naturally occupies the forefront of everyone’s attention—
is substantially limited.41
Moreover, if we assume that the President and agencies understand as
much and are devoted to maximally promoting their ideological preferences,
agencies themselves may take advantage of an emergency's distracting
effects on the public. For example, agencies can propose more technically
and politically questionable rules than they otherwise ever would have,
knowing that the relevant constituent groups in the public will not be able to
adequately respond. From a normative perspective, this is troubling. On the
39
See, e.g., id. at 279–80 (describing cases where courts invalidated rules promulgated without notice
and comment under de novo review of the good cause exception).
40
See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 22, at 291.
41
See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
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one hand, when an agency promulgates rules in full compliance with its
published notice-and-comment procedures, it is complying with the letter of
the law. But when it does so knowing the comment period is insufficient as
a practical matter, the agency is not complying with the spirit or the purpose
of the law, which is to engage the public in more meaningful ways.
Sometimes courts overturn agency rules when they were promulgated with
insufficient notice-and-comment time.42 But if the rules are upheld by the
courts because agencies provided technically and statutorily enough time for
notice and comment, then agencies should be understood as having distorted
the administrative process as it should operate in a well-ordered democracy.
This argument was made forcefully by an array of groups, including
state and local governments, in the spring of 2020 as the severity of the
pandemic began to become clear. The pandemic was (and currently remains)
a national emergency in both the common-sense definition of the term and
by statutory definition: In March of 2020, President Trump declared the
pandemic a national emergency in every state and territory under the NEA,
the Public Health Service Act, and the Stafford Act.43 Governors in every
state confirmed the declaration by issuing emergency declarations and
seeking federal emergency recognition and assistance. 44 During this time,
members of Congress wrote President Trump asking for a moratorium in
rulemaking, 45 as did NGOs. 46 Additionally, and as part of a genuinely
42

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19)
Outbreak, Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020); Letter from President Donald J.
Trump to Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Treasury, Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. & Pete T. Gaynor, Adm’r, Fed.
Emergency Mgmt. Agency (Mar. 13, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2020/03/LetterFromThePresident.pdf [https://perma.cc/59GS-M6HY] [hereinafter Letter from President
Donald J. Trump].
44
See COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders: Executive Orders, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS:,
https://web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders [https://perma.cc/6MLL-RAGS] (listing orders declaring
national emergencies by state).
45
Letter from Members of Congress to Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., U.S. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.bennet.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/4/8/4886b15b-c3a5-4d96-ae6bb77325797fa6/7D0732946C1C20E16DFC31ECD8548C8D.united-states-senate-letter-to-omb-actingdirector-vought.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWA9-37K7]; Michael Karlik, Bennet and Senate Democrats Ask
Trump Administration to Pause Rulemaking, COLO. POL. (May 15, 2020), https://www.
coloradopolitics.com/news/bennet-and-senate-democrats-ask-trump-administration-to-pauserulemaking/article_b8ff3304-7db0-11ea-b217-83c5f384f577.html [https://perma.cc/VP52-Z7U7]; Chris
Marr, Governors, Mayors Ask Trump to Halt Regulatory Comment Clock (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 20,
2020, 2:24 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/governors-mayors-urge-trump-topause-regulatory-comment-clock [https://perma.cc/29PU-4MF8].
46
Letter from NGOs to Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., U.S. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget (Mar. 19,
2020), https://aboutblaw.com/PDw [https://perma.cc/8RW6-SHE4]; Letter from Ctr. for Progressive
Reform to Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., U.S. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://aboutblaw.com/PDv [https://perma.cc/HS5S-WSHS].
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bipartisan effort, the National Governors Association and other associations
of state and local governments requested reasonable extensions to comment
periods:
On behalf of the nation’s states, cities, and counties, we write to request a formal
pause, beginning on March 11, for all open public comment periods concerning
both active rulemakings and nonrulemaking notices across every federal
department or agency. . . .
....
Consistent and meaningful engagement and consultation between
intergovernmental partners is vital in the development and implementation of
effective policies, programs and regulations. Therefore, state and local
governments urge you to extend agency comment periods for a reasonable
period of time, which will allow our state and local policymakers to focus on
addressing the nation’s immediate pandemic response needs and ensure their
ability to devote proper consideration of agency regulations.47

When the Trump Administration proposed a slurry of rules unrelated to
the pandemic all at once rather than slowing the pace of rulemaking, various
groups also requested extensions to comment periods for proposed
rulemaking. Indeed, as has been documented, Trump Administration
agencies intentionally sped up the rulemaking process for nonpandemicrelated rules.48 Almost without exception, agencies denied the requests for
extending comment periods,49 which left members of the public with little
choice but to respond to the proposed rulemakings as best they could in the
time provided. Of course, parties affected by the proposed rulemaking could
go to court and argue that an agency’s refusal to provide extra comment time
or other opportunities for public input during a true national emergency was
unlawful. But the courts have not been receptive to arguments that an agency

47
State and Local Government Organizations Seek Pause on Public Comments on Rulemaking
Processes, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.nga.org/advocacy-communications/
letters-nga/state-and-local-government-organizations-seek-pause-on-public-comments-on-rulemakingprocesses [https://perma.cc/2JFR-Q7X2] (explaining that “our members are facing massive challenges in
responding to, and as a result of, this global pandemic”).
48
Eric Lipton, A Regulatory Rush by Federal Agencies to Secure Trump’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us/politics/regulatory-rush-federal-agencies-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/W66G-6ZZ9]; Toluse Olorunnipa, Trump Forges Ahead with Broader Agenda Even as
Coronavirus Upends the Country, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-coronavirus-immigration-environment-inspectorsgeneral/2020/04/08/bc1590e2-79b9-11ea-b6ff-597f170df8f8_story.html [https://perma.cc/566J-XYJR].
49
See, e.g., Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Denies Requests to Extend Comment Deadline on Advice
Proposal, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/dol-denies-commentdeadline-extension-195851 [https://perma.cc/53EF-SZ7F] (denying request to extend the deadline for
public comment for a rule that would exempt investment fiduciaries to receive compensation).
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has a legal obligation to provide anyone in the public any more time than is
required under the standard agency rules.50
If relief in the form of court-mandated extensions is not realistic—and
it does not appear to be—then is there a solution or solutions to the problem
of substantively insufficient notice and comment during emergencies as we
have recently been experiencing? The need for such a solution is wellillustrated by the Trump Administration’s effort to promulgate a rule and
then expand a rule during the pandemic that would have hamstrung health
and safety regulation and potentially cost thousands of lives. In 2018, the
EPA published a proposed rule, Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory
Science, also known as the scientific evidence rule, that would effectively
preclude regulators from relying on a range of well-regarded, indeed
foundational, public health studies in setting public health standards.51 The
reaction from the scientific community, among others, was intense and
included a withering critique of the EPA’s analysis.52 Then in March 2020,
the EPA published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking that would
vastly increase the scope of the rule as originally proposed in 2018 and, with
it, the costs to public health. 53 Commentators strenuously argued for
50

See, e.g., Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 534 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (“Neither statute nor regulation mandates that the agency do more [than the agency’s choice of
comment period] . . . . We shall not gainsay the [agency’s] conclusion . . . .”).
51
Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768, 18,772 (proposed Apr.
30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30) (“The proposed rule includes a provision allowing the
Administrator to exempt significant regulatory decisions on a case-by-case basis if he or she determines
that compliance is impracticable because it is not feasible to ensure that all dose response data and models
underlying pivotal regulatory science are publicly available in a fashion that is consistent with law,
protects privacy and confidentiality . . . .”).
52
Rebecca Worby, What Scientists Are Saying About the EPA’s ‘Secret Science’ Rule, PAC.
STANDARD (Sept. 23, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/what-scientists-are-saying-about-epasecret-science-rule [https://perma.cc/HG7Z-MA9Z]; see, e.g., State & Local Att’ys Gen., Sec’y of Pa.
Dep’t of Env’t Prot. & Att’ys, Comment Letter on Proposal to Limit Use of Scientific Evidence in
Rulemaking 1–2 (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/multistate_comments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BC5K-N4EP] (criticizing the rule for precluding “relevant, probative scientific studies,
models, or other information” only because the information is not publicly available); Jeremy Berg, Philip
Campbell, Veronique Kiermer, Natasha Raikhel & Deborah Sweet, Joint Statement on EPA Proposed
Rule and Public Availability of Data, SCIENCE (May 4, 2018) https://science.sciencemag.org/
content/360/6388/eaau0116 [https://perma.cc/NM3L-XQTY] (supporting relying on data that is not
publicly available); Robinson Meyer, Even Geologists Hate the EPA’s New Science Rule, ATLANTIC (July
17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/scott-pruitts-secret-science-rule-couldstill-become-law/565325 [https://perma.cc/P5U7-MYZ7] (discussing the difficulties of medical
professionals and researchers to publish information about patients because of patient privacy and its
effect on the rule).
53
See Laura Bloomer, More Legal Questions in EPA’s Supplemental Regulatory Science Proposal,
HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Apr. 27, 2020), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/more-legalquestions-in-epas-supplemental-regulatory-science-proposal [https://perma.cc/JZ6D-4V7P] (explaining
the history of the rulemaking, including the sweeping expansion of the rule first promulgated during the
pandemic).
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extensions to the notice-and-comment period to accommodate the fact that
affected groups and governments lacked the resources to properly analyze
the agency proposal and submit comments given the demands posed by the
pandemic.54 The EPA ultimately backed down to an extent and allowed some
extension in time, but those extensions should have been automatic and more
generous.55 In early January 2021, as a result of the lack of time to comment
on and advocate against the proposal, the Trump EPA was able to publish
the final rule with almost no modifications to reflect comments.56 Now the
rule is technically in effect and the EPA under President Biden must
determine how to freeze, work around, or otherwise undo the rule. 57
However, if Trump had been re-elected, the lack of an extended comment
period as scientists and others demanded might have made a critical
difference in any court challenge to the rule: The fewer and less developed
critical comments there are in the administrative record, the easier it is for
the EPA to convince a court that it took account of all relevant information
presented to it and acted reasonably such that the court should defer to the
agency and uphold the rule as lawful.58
II. TWO POSSIBLE REFORMS
A. A Statute Extending Comment Periods During Emergencies
Beginning with a discussion of a potential statutory solution, Part II of
this Essay explores the two solutions we have proposed to help mitigate the
potential harm of rulemaking during emergencies when notice-and-comment
periods may necessitate extension due to the public’s limited capacity during
emergencies. The first way we propose to address this risk of insufficient
comment periods during emergencies is through an ex ante federal statute
54
See, e.g., Earthjustice, Comment Letter on EPA’s “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory
Science” Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 14–15 (May 18, 2020), https://www.ametsoc.org
/index.cfm/ams/about-ams/ams-position-letters/multi-organization-letter-providing-comments-on-theepa-proposed-rule-strengthening-transparency-in-regulatory-science [https://perma.cc/78T3-TJZM].
55
See Rachel Frazin, EPA Gives Public More Time to Comment on ‘Secret Science’ Rule, HILL (Apr.
2, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/490898-epa-gives-public-more-timeto-comment-on-secret-science-rule [https://perma.cc/H95V-979Y]; Letter from Representative Eddie
Bernice Johnson, Chairwoman, Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., to Andrew Wheeler, Adm’r, EPA (May
6, 2020), https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/LTR%20-%20EBJ%20to%20Wheeler%20re%20
SNPRM%205.6.pdf [https://perma.cc/U57V-8PTQ] (requesting a further extension of the public
comment period).
56
See Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30).
57
See Stephen Lee & Jennifer Hijazi, Biden Team in a Bind over Reversing EPA’s ‘Secret Science’
Rule, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 6, 2021, 11:57 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/biden-team-in-a-bind-over-reversing-epas-secret-science-rule [https://perma.cc/YHD8-S75Q].
58
See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
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that would apply to future emergencies regardless of the political party in
power. Such a statute could be structured in a variety of ways. It could be
very specific, as in requiring an automatic thirty- or sixty-day extension of
comment periods during an emergency as defined by the statute, at least for
rules that are not addressing government efforts to confront the emergency.
Or it could be more general, providing something like “all agencies shall
provide reasonable additional time for comments for any nonemergencyrelated rule proposed during a period of national emergency.” The advantage
of the first approach would be clarity and the avoidance of possible litigation
over what is “reasonable.” Even under this statute, moreover, there could be
a provision for an agency to seek court permission not to extend the comment
period if the agency could show that an extension was unwarranted or would
be contrary to the public interest.59 The advantage of the second approach
would be flexibility, while the use of the word “shall” would still incentivize
agencies to allow extensions more than under the current legal regime. On
an expressive level, such a statute would communicate a legislative
recognition that notice-and-comment procedures are important and,
therefore, that formal or literal compliance with them is insufficient if the
substantive purposes of notice and comment cannot be achieved.
There are at least two difficult issues or potential objections to this
proposed solution: (1) how would “emergency” be defined in the statute and,
in particular, how could it be defined so that the statute is not inappropriately
used to delay regulation for no good reason, and (2) would the statute
encourage agencies to avoid its applicability by straining to label every
proposed rule as related to combatting the emergency? We address each
issue in turn.
There are several options for how to define emergency within this
proposed statutory solution. The most obvious trigger for an automatic
comment period extension would be the declaration of an emergency under
one of the federal statutes that provide for such declarations. Because the
threshold for the President declaring a national emergency under the NEA is
so low and the statute is now so overused, its definition of emergency should
probably not serve as the basis for an automatic comment extension.60 By
contrast, there has only been one national emergency declared under the
59

See supra Section I.B.2.
For proposals to address inadequate limits on the President under the National Emergencies Act,
see Elizabeth Goitein, The Law Governing National Emergencies Needs Fixing, BRENNAN CTR FOR JUST.
(July 31, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/law-governing-nationalemergencies-needs-fixing [https://perma.cc/9P6K-7ZPY]; N.Y.C. BAR, REPORT BY THE TASK FORCE ON
THE RULE OF LAW: THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT MUST BE REVISED 1–2 (2020),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2020683-ArticleOneActNEA.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8BFB-KAM2].
60
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Stafford Act: the current pandemic.61 Additionally, the Stafford Act has some
criteria for what constitutes an emergency.62 The trigger for an extension on
the comment period could be the designation of a national disaster in the
majority of states under the Stafford Act. Another alternative is to leverage
a declaration of national emergency (or emergency in a majority of the states)
under the Public Health Service Act as a trigger for extending the comment
period. Regardless of the statutory definition leveraged and in order to help
ensure that the comment extensions are appropriately used since some
declared national emergencies may continue for a long time—again, the
COVID-19 pandemic is an example—it might be prudent to limit comment
extensions to rules proposed within 90 or 180 days of the initial declaration
of emergency. A further refinement in the statute might be to provide for
extensions of comment periods for rules that predominantly or exclusively
affect a particular state while that state was confronting an emergency, as
evidenced by the declaration of an emergency in the state under the Stafford
Act or Public Health Service Act.
Such statutory triggers for extending comment periods, however, might
be underinclusive—for example, not capturing major terrorist attacks or
initiation of war. It could also be overinclusive in that some national or
widescale emergencies may not rise to a level that justifies across-the-board
extensions to comment periods. Thus, an alternative approach would be to
effectively delegate the decision to extend comment periods to the National
Governors Association and other bipartisan state and local government
associations 63 such that an extension period would be triggered once
requested by the organizations without significant dissent among the
membership. This bipartisan aspect of the trigger would be important to
avoid having the comment period extension be used by those who simply
oppose the party in power and want to slow down their regulatory initiatives
however possible.
It is entirely possible that agencies, to avoid a statutory extension of the
comment period, would seek to characterize their proposed rules as
61
See Letter from President Donald J. Trump, supra note 43. For an overview of the Stafford Act,
which governs natural disaster emergency declarations, see Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act Fact Sheet, supra note 36.
62
Under the Act, “[e]mergencies are defined as any event for which federal assistance is needed to
supplement state/local efforts to save lives, protect public health and safety, protect property, or avert the
threat of a catastrophe. Pandemic influenza and other communicable diseases are defined as emergencies
eligible for coverage under the Stafford Act.” Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act Fact Sheet, supra note 36; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (defining an emergency as “any
occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to
supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States”).
63
See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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emergency-related and hence not subject to the extension.64 To prevent this,
the statute could require an agency to explain why a rule is reasonably related
to the emergency and hence not subject to an extended comment period in
its proposal. Moreover, some rules simply cannot be characterized as
reasonably related to an emergency: For example, a Department of Interior
proposed rule to open up federal land to more oil and gas drilling over the
next decade simply has no reasonable relationship to the current pandemic.65
B. Modifying the Administrative Record Rule
A statute is not the only way to address this risk. Courts can guard
against executive abuse by adding to the court-made exceptions to the
administrative record rule. That rule generally precludes judicial
consideration of new information and arguments once the administrative
record is closed, but exceptions already proliferate.
The administrative record rule grew out of lawsuits against agencies
under the APA. Under the APA’s judicial review provisions, “the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party.”66 The question
that has bedeviled courts relates to the meaning of “the whole record.” In the
influential case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the
Supreme Court emphasized that “review is to be based on the full
administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his
decision.”67 The Court was cognizant, even then, of not allowing an agency
to fashion some post hoc set of documents in order to influence judicial
review. The Court made this concern explicit in Camp v. Pitts when it noted
that “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record
already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing
court.”68
In the years following Overton Park and Pitts, courts have used this
doctrine not only to provide a minimum guarantee of agency disclosure but
also to provide a maximum cap on what an agency must produce for

64
See Connor Raso, Emergency Rulemaking in Response to COVID-19, BROOKINGS (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/emergency-rulemaking-in-response-to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/
ZYZ5-DKZT] (reviewing so-called “emergency” rules and whether they were really related to the
COVID-19 emergency).
65
For a list of federal natural resources rules and actions expedited as a result of the COVID-19
emergency, see Letter from Katharine Sinclair MacGregor, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to
Larry Kudlow, Dir., Nat’l Econ. Council (July 15, 2020), https://biologicaldiversity.org/
programs/public_lands/pdfs/Department-of-the-Interior-Response-to-EO-13927.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NV8D-N8WX].
66
5 U.S.C. § 706.
67
401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
68
411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
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purposes of judicial review. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, for
example, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he reviewing court is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed, and
to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry[,]” but instead must
rely on the “record the agency presents to the reviewing court.”69 Because
the agency itself controls the record that it presents to the reviewing court,
the possibility of abuse is apparent. Indeed, “agencies are able to manipulate
the decision-making process by providing justifications—crafted to survive
legal challenges—as a mere pretext to cover their actual justifications,
thereby avoiding meaningful judicial review.”70 And for the most part, courts
have declined to look beyond the official record that the agency presents to
scrutinize the basis for agency decision-making. As one commentary put it:
“the overwhelming majority of courts have declined to use Overton Park’s
exception to look beyond the administrative record.”71
However, some courts have been cognizant of the draconian nature of
the rule expounded in Florida Light and the possibilities of continued abuse
by agencies. Such courts have fashioned several exceptions to the record rule
that allow plaintiffs to supplement the record with additional information or
documents or even to conduct discovery or take depositions of agency
officials.72 In extreme cases, such as the recent case involving the citizenship
question on the official United States census form, courts have ordered
further inquiry into the basis for agency decision-making where the official
record offers a mere pretext.73 Some commentators have called for further
judicial scrutiny of pretextual agency decision-making.74
In broader terms, courts have fashioned exceptions to the record rule
under several circumstances, such as when it must determine whether the
agency considered all relevant factors, where plaintiffs can show bad faith
on the part of the agency, or where the agency relied on documents, not in

69

470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985).
Laura Boyer, Comment, Expanding the Administrative Record: Using Pretext to Show “Bad Faith
or Improper Behavior,” 92 U. COLO. L. REV. 613, 617 (2021).
71
James D. Cromley & J. Michael Showalter, Going Beyond: When Can Courts Look Past the
Record in an APA Review?, GEO. ENV’T L. REV. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
environmental-law-review/blog/going-beyond-when-can-courts-look-past-the-record-in-an-apa-review
[https://perma.cc/XDC5-Q844].
72
See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 20-cv-103, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 172979, at *23–29 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2020) (reviewing legal standards and cases).
73
See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (“Reasoned decisionmaking under
the Administrative Procedure Act calls for an explanation for agency action. What was provided here was
more of a distraction.”).
74
See generally Boyer, supra note 70 (raising the concern that limited judicial review of pretextual
decision-making leads to undermining of courts’ legitimacy and compromise of separation of powers).
70
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the record.75 These exceptions are not uniform across circuits. For example,
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, and arguably the D.C. Circuit as
well, have been more willing to consider extrarecord evidence and have
taken a less absolutist posture toward the administrative record rule than the
Sixth or Federal Circuits.76 An influential commentary noted eight general
categories that various courts use to allow evidence beyond what the agency
deems to be the official record.77 As commentators have noted for some time,
it is difficult to tell what truly remains of the administrative record rule.78
Notwithstanding the aforementioned holdouts, this trend of recognizing
exceptions to the record rule seems to be only accelerating. Especially in the
wake of recent Supreme Court cases, such as Department of Commerce v.
New York, some commentators have predicted and argued for a continued
expansion of the administrative record to allow courts to consider more than
simply what the agency deems to be “the record.”79 As one commentator put
it: “recently, some district courts have begun to apply an expansive reading
of the record rule in reviewing informal agency action” and will consider
“any materials considered by agency personnel involved in the decisionmaking process (not just the ultimate decisionmaker), including ‘internal

75
Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[i]n limited
circumstances, district courts are permitted to admit extra-record evidence: (1) if admission is necessary
to determine ‘whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,’ (2)
if ‘the agency has relied on documents not in the record,’ (3) ‘when supplementing the record is necessary
to explain technical terms or complex subject matter,’ or (4) ‘when plaintiffs make a showing of agency
bad faith.’”) (quoting Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
76
See Travis O. Brandon, Reforming the Extra-Record Evidence Rule in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review of Informal Agency Actions: A New Procedural Approach, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 981, 991–
93, 998, 1001 (2017) (reviewing the complex nature of each circuit’s exceptions).
77
Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in
Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 344 (1984) (listing the eight categories as “(1)
when agency action is not adequately explained in the record before the court; (2) when the agency failed
to consider factors which are relevant to its final decision; (3) when an agency considered evidence which
it failed to include in the record; (4) when a case is so complex that a court needs more evidence to enable
it to understand the issues clearly; (5) in cases where evidence arising after the agency action shows
whether the decision was correct or not; (6) in cases where agencies are sued for a failure to take action;
(7) in cases arising under the National Environmental Policy Act; and (8) in cases where relief is at issue,
especially at the preliminary injunction stage”).
78
Id. at 358–59.
79
See Peter Constable Alter, Note, A Record of What? The Proper Scope of an Administrative Record
for Informal Agency Action, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2020); Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A.
Platt, Recent Developments: Administrative Records After Department of Commerce v. New York,
72 ADMIN. L. REV. 87, 98 (2020) (“We predict that unless the Court signals the Department of Commerce
opinion as a one-off case, APA record supplementation by traditional discovery tools and otherwise will
proliferate in the lower courts.”) (footnote omitted).
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comments, draft reports, inter- or intra-agency emails, revisions,
memoranda, or meeting notes that inform an agency’s final decision.’”80
The point is not whether an expanded records rule is warranted. For our
purposes, the point is that courts already carve out numerous exceptions to
the administrative record rule and do so in a flexible, common-sense manner.
It would hardly be much of a stretch for courts to recognize an additional
exception when an administrative agency pushes rules during a time of
emergency. Indeed, many of the concerns motivating the existing
exceptions—rooted both in the possibility of abuse by an agency interested
in artificially narrowing the administrative record and the possibility that a
court may not have all the relevant information before it when it makes its
decision—are also present in the case of rushed rulemaking during
emergencies. This is especially true when petitioners are unable to introduce
highly relevant technical arguments and data because the notice-andcomment period was not extended to allow the time needed to gather and
present critiques of the proposed rule. By fashioning such an exception,
courts would effectively undo the damage done by the failure of the
executive branch to afford the public the time it needed to develop and
present the data. This will in turn allow a court to genuinely determine the
rationality of the rule.
For example, in the case of the Trump-era scientific evidence rule
discussed above, a court might allow introduction of evidence concerning
the damaging effects of the rule even if such evidence had not been submitted
to the agency during the notice-and-comment period. A court might be
especially inclined to do so if the parties had notified the agency during the
notice-and-comment period that they were working on a scientific critique
but would be unable to submit it by the deadline due to the ongoing pandemic
emergency. In such a case, the agency would at least have had notice of the
deadline problem and an opportunity to extend the deadline in light of the
emergency. And if the agency chose not to extend the deadline, it would in
a sense have brought any problems of ex post evidence upon itself. At the
very least, a court could take all of these factors into account in fashioning
an appropriate remedy much in the same way courts currently do with respect
to other extrarecord evidence.
Of course, ex post accommodation of extrarecord evidence would not
address one of the problems with regulating during emergencies.
Emergencies create a political environment in which some regulations are
promulgated that in a less distorted and thus normatively “better” political

80
See Alter, supra note 79, at 1048–49 (alteration omitted) (quoting Inst. for Fisheries Res. v.
Burwell, No. 16-cv-01574-VC, 2017 WL 89003, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017)).
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environment would not have been promulgated in the first place. Therefore,
this ex post solution cannot stop a rule from being promulgated in the first
place. However, our court-based proposal does not pose the risk of strategic
uses of extension periods to slow down regulation by opponents of that
regulation.
A court-based proposal may indeed be the most realistic path toward
some recognition of the problem we describe—that of rulemaking during
emergencies—especially given the existing trend of courts considering
extrarecord evidence for myriad other reasons. The flexibility of the existing
exceptions, combined with courts’ increased willingness to scrutinize agency
decision-making by looking beyond the official agency-created record, make
our court-based proposal both a modest extension of current law and a
potentially powerful tool to curb agency abuse of emergencies.
CONCLUSION
The current pandemic has highlighted the need for Congress and federal
courts to rein in agencies’ attempts to use emergencies to push through
controversial rules. Both the legislative and judicial branches can play an
important role in ensuring the integrity of the rulemaking process when that
integrity is threatened by the decreased public participation that an
emergency creates. While there may certainly be risks associated with either
Congress or the courts stepping in, these risks can be amply mitigated and
do not outweigh the significant benefits to the technocratic and deliberative
democratic goals of the rulemaking process. Indeed, such reforms would be
one of the most productive ways to not let the current emergency “go to
waste.”
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